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From Compassion to Compensation: 
The Effect of Injury Severity on Mock Jurors’ 
Liability Judgments1
Brian H. Bornstein2
Louisiana State University
Two studies were performed to ascertain the effect of injury severity on par-
ticipants’ judgments in a simulated jury task. Participants read a summary of a 
personal-injury case in which the severity of the plaintiff’s injury was varied: 
they were asked to judge the defendant’s liability, award compensation, and 
rate their feelings toward the litigants. In Study 1, more severely hurt plaintiffs 
were more likely to obtain a favorable verdict, even though evidence of liabil-
ity was held constant. Greater severity infl uenced liability judgments only in-
sofar as it elicited positive feelings toward the plaintiff or negative feelings to-
ward the defendant. In Study 2, severity was found to have no effect when par-
ticipants could not award damages, suggesting that more severe injuries arouse 
feelings for the litigants that are associated with a motivation to alleviate the 
plaintiffs suffering or to punish the defendant. Strategies for reducing the ex-
tralegal infl uence of injury severity are discussed. 
Personal-injury lawsuits vary in innumerable ways, such as the number and 
type of defendants, the alleged cause of the injury, the number of plaintiffs, 
and the rule that is used in determining liability. Any or all of these factors 
may infl uence a case’s outcome should it go to trial. For example, plaintiffs 
obtain more favorable verdicts when they sue corporate, as opposed to indi-
vidual, defendants (Bornstein, 1994; Chin & Peterson, 1985; Hans & Ermann, 
1989);3 when the alleged cause of the plaintiff’s injury corresponds well to 
jurors’ naive intuitions regarding the origin of certain types of injury (Born-
stein & Rajki, 1994 ); as the number of plaintiffs involved increases (Horow-
1477
1 A portion of this paper was presented at the 1993 Southwestern Cognition Conference in 
Arlington, Texas. I am grateful to T. Carter and S. Lamoureux for running subjects, to T. Buckley 
for statistical advice, and to J. Wilson for helpful comments on the manuscript. 
2 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Brian H. Bornstein, Depart-
ment of Psychology, 236 Audubon Hall, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803. 
3 In discussing this “deep-pocket” effect, it is necessary to defi ne what constitutes a “favorable ver-
dict.” Wealthy, corporate defendants might be more likely to be found liable. without actually having to 
pay greater compensation once liability has been established (Bornstein, 1994; Vidmar, 1993). 
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itz & Bordens, 1988); and when a strict liability rule, rather than one requiring 
a demonstration of negligence, is employed (Calfee & Winston, 1988; Landes 
& Posner, 1987). 
A necessary feature of all personal-injury cases is that someone has, at 
least allegedly, been injured. Thus, another variable in the constellation of 
factors that may vary across these cases is the extent of the plaintiff’s inju-
ry. The same act—for instance, running a red light and hitting another car—
can be identical in every detail (the cars’ speed and point of impact, the driv-
ers’ mental state and use of seatbelts, the number of persons involved) except 
for the act’s consequences. The occupant of the car that is hit, subsequently 
the plaintiff, might suffer injuries ranging from superfi cial cuts and bruises to 
paralysis or death. 
Injury severity is of special interest in the trial context because it is of-
ten relevant to some judgments that jurors are asked to make, but not others. 
Specifi cally, it may be relevant to the awarding of compensatory damages—a 
plaintiff who has been hurt worse requires more in the way of restitution—but 
not to determining the defendant’s liability for the act itself. Factual matters 
under dispute, such as the color of the traffi c light and whether the plaintiffs 
car was sticking out too far into the intersection, are independent of what hap-
pened to the plaintiff after the car was hit. An effect of injury severity on liabil-
ity judgments would show that jurors can be infl uenced by “extralegal” factors, 
as opposed to legally relevant evidence used in determining facts-in-issue.4 
An abundance of research suggests that jurors are infl uenced by extralegal 
considerations that are present, but not formally presented, at trial (e.g.. Dane 
& Wrightsman, 1982; Davis, 1989; Reskin & Visher, 1986). For example, 
Kalven and Zeisel (1966) found that the majority of disagreements between 
judge and jury were due not to evidentiary factors, but to disagreements con-
cerning “values” or sentiments. Specifi cally, judges believed that extralegal 
sentiments, such as feelings about an individual defendant, infl uenced jurors’ 
interpretation of the evidence. Defendant characteristics mentioned by judges 
as capable of producing positive sentiments included age, gender, attractive-
ness, and occupation. The importance of these factors has been corroborated 
in simulation studies showing, for example, that more lenient treatment is giv-
en to female (Cruse & Leigh, 1987) and relatively attractive defendants (Si-
gall & Ostrove, 1975). 
4 Injury severity is also largely irrelevant to the determination of punitive damages, 
which are. designed to punish the defendant, rather than to compensate the plaintiff. The 
extent to which mock jurors are able to adhere to the purposes served by the different types 
of damages is unclear (Baron. & Ritov, 1993; Cather, Greene, & Durham, 1996). It is be-
yond the scope of this paper to compare the rationales behind different types of damages. It 
is clear, in any case, that the extent of the plaintiff’s injury is more directly relevant to com-
pensatory than to punitive damages. 
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Injury Severity and Liability Judgments
Research focusing on subjects’ attributions of responsibility for different 
types of actions has addressed the issue of an action’s consequences (Burg-
er, 1981). For example, Walster (1966) and Phares and Wilson (1972) have 
shown that greater responsibility for an accident is attributed to the actor as 
the accident’s consequences become more severe. 
Based on these fi ndings, one might predict that a personal-injury defen-
dant is more likely to be found liable (i.e., legally responsible) as the conse-
quences for the plaintiff become more severe. However, the applicability of 
these fi ndings to personal-injury trials is limited. Although the accident situa-
tions described in the attribution literature (e.g., Walster, 1966) are similar to 
those one might fi nd in a personal-injury trial, they are typically not present-
ed within a simulated trial context. Participants make responsibility attribu-
tions by assigning numerical ratings, but they are not instructed on how those 
ratings might correspond to a defi nition of legal liability and be used in reach-
ing a verdict. The general sense of responsibility and its legal usage are clear-
ly related (e.g., Fincham & Jaspars, 1980), but they are not the same (Hart & 
Honore, 1985). Thus, it is diffi cult to extrapolate from fi ndings on the gener-
al phenomenon of responsibility attribution to a trial situation involving very 
specifi c criteria for jurors’ liability judgments. 
It is reasonable to assume that jurors would respond emotionally to a 
plaintiff who has suffered some injury, in the same way that people general-
ly respond emotionally to the distress of others (Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 
1987). According to Batson et al. (1987), this emotional response to another’s 
suffering leads to helping behavior. Within the context of a personal-injury 
trial, helping the plaintiff takes the form of awarding compensation in restitu-
tion for the plaintiffs injuries, regardless of the helper’s underlying motivation 
(i.e., the trial situation does not enable a distinction between different types of 
helping, as defi ned by Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). Pos-
itive sentiments for an injured plaintiff could therefore contain a motivation to 
help by relieving the plaintiffs suffering. 
Different emotions tend to be associated with different motives (Leep-
er, 1963; Weiner& Graham, 1989) or states of action readiness (Frijda, 1987; 
Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). According to Frijda et al. (1989), ac-
tion readiness is an important component of emotional experience because 
it is what links experience and behavior. For example, the emotion of fear 
is characterized by avoidance of some stimulus, while happiness motivates 
one to stay near a stimulus (Frijda, 1987). A more severely injured plaintiff 
would produce a stronger emotional response. Because emotional intensity 
is associated with certain cognitive appraisal patterns (Clore, 1994) and be-
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cause appraisal and action readiness are highly correlated (Frijda, 1987; Fri-
jda, et al., 1989), a stronger emotional response would therefore be associat-
ed with a stronger action tendency to help the plaintiff by awarding compen-
sation. Within the constraints of a formal trial, that behavior can only be ac-
complished given a prior judgment of liability; so injury severity would infl u-
ence jurors’ evaluation of the facts (an extralegal infl uence) in order to justify 
the desired outcome of compensation. 
In civil cases (specifi cally, torts), the defendant’s loss is the plaintiffs gain. 
Sentiment toward the litigants in personal-injury cases is reciprocal, such that 
increasing the positive feelings toward one party has a negative effect on jurors, 
feelings toward that party’s antagonist (Bornstein, 1994). Thus, in addition to 
motivating jurors to help the plaintiff through compensation, positive sentiment 
for an injured plaintiff could also be associated with a motivation to punish the 
allegedly responsible defendant by making him pay more in damages. Both mo-
tives can only be satisfi ed by fi nding for the plaintiff and against the defendant. 
Experimental Overview
The present studies address the infl uence of injury severity on subjects’ judg-
ments in a simulated personal-injury trial. A civil trial is used because, unlike 
criminal trials, the victim’s suffering can be alleviated in a material way by ju-
rors’ verdict. The cases are simplifi ed so that the sole fact-in-issue is causation-
that is, whether the defendant’s action is capable of causing the plaintiffs injury. 
Participants’ task is to estimate the probability of causation, and from their cau-
sation judgments to make decisions about liability and damages. Where causa-
tion is the only fact-in-issue, an attribution of liability is a simple refl ection of 
the causal attribution: If the defendant is more likely than not to have caused the 
injury (i.e., using the preponderance of the evidence standard), then he is liable; 
if not, then he is not liable. Although attributions of causality and responsibili-
ty are partially independent (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980), the primary (and some-
times sole) factor in determining liability for personal injury is usually whether 
or not the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury (Hart & Honore, 1985). 
The purpose of Study 1 is to test whether injury severity has an effect on 
participants’ factual judgments in the context of a personal-injury trial. Injury 
severity has been shown to infl uence attributions of responsibility, with great-
er responsibility being attributed for an action as the severity of its outcome 
increases (e.g., Walster, 1966). Injury severity is predicted to have a similar 
effect on jurors’ judgments, where responsibility is construed as legal liability. 
Although severity is directly relevant to the issue of compensation, an effect 
on the prior determination of liability would constitute an extralegal bias. 
Study 2 investigates the circumstances under which severity affects liabil-
ity judgments. By varying whether or not subjects are able to award damages, 
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as well as the type of damages, the role of severity in arousing an emotional 
response having specifi c action tendencies can be assessed. 
Study 1
The purpose of Study 1 is to investigate to what extent the severity of the 
plaintiffs injury affects judgments of liability and compensation. The hypoth-
esis is that a more severely injured plaintiff will obtain more favorable judg-
ments than will a less severely injured plaintiff. Thus, participants’ liability 
judgments are predicted to vary with severity, even though the evidence about 
the injury’s cause is held constant—clearly violating legal guidelines. Senti-
ment for the plaintiff is predicted to be a mediating factor, such that severity 
in and of itself only affects liability judgments to the extent that it infl uences 
participants’ feelings toward the plaintiff. 
Participants’ monetary awards are also predicted to vary with severity, 
but such an effect would not violate legal guidelines. Once liability has been 
established, more severely injured plaintiffs are usually entitled to greater 
compensation. The primary, immediate function of compensatory damages 
is to provide restitution; since more severely injured persons will, on aver-
age, have lost more, they will require more to achieve restitution (Landes & 
Posner, 1987). 
Method
Participants
The participants were 83 students who either were paid $6/hr for volun-
teering or received extra course credit. The sample consisted largely of col-
lege undergraduates between the ages of 18 and 25, although a minority of the 
paid volunteers were graduate students or nonstudents who responded to ad-
vertisements posted on campus (precise fi gures are unavailable, as this infor-
mation was not requested of the participants).5
Materials and Design
A trial scenario was constructed which described a woman with ovarian 
cancer, who was suing a large drug company, alleging that the birth-control 
5 Including the form of participants’ payment (money or course credit) as a factor in the 
analyses yielded no signifi cant main effects or interactions. The implications of the rela-
tively homogeneous sample for generalizing to the behavior of real jurors are considered in 
the General Discussion. 
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pills made by the company caused her disease (Bornstein & Rajki, 1994). 
The case was modifi ed from actual lawsuits (Huber, 1988) and is summa-
rized in Table 1. The case was one single-spaced page long and contained the 
following elements: (a) a description of the plaintiff, the plaintiffs injury and 
its consequences; (b) a description of the defendant; (c) the plaintiffs claim, 
requested compensation ($500,000 for medical costs, pain and suffering), 
and known facts; (d) the major issue at trial, portrayed as being whether the 
defendant’s product is, in general, capable of causing an injury such as that 
suffered by the plaintiff; and (e) expert scientifi c testimony on both sides, 
constructed to be roughly equal in strength. The scientifi c evidence was pre-
sented in order to resolve the primary fact-in-issue of whether the pills cause 
ovarian cancer. 
The case had both a high-severity and a low-severity injury condition (Ta-
ble 1). Only the severity of the injury and its consequences differed between 
conditions; the nature of the injury and all other details were constant for the 
two versions of the case. 
Table 1
Case Summary
Trial element       Description
Plaintiff  Kathy Johnson, age 32, who has ovarian cancer. She is asking 
for $500,000 to compensate for medical costs, pain and suffer-
ing. 
 Low-severity  Cancer detected early; one ovary removed, so still able 
 injury condition  to have children. Excellent prognosis, with minimal chance of 
recurrence. 
 High-severity  Cancer detected late; both ovaries removed, so unable 
 injury condition  to have children. Poor prognosis, with spread of cancer and 
short life expectancy. 
Defendant  Manufacturer of birth-control pills, a large drug company. 
Facts-in-issue  Major issue at trial is whether or not the pills cause cancer. 
Evidence  Plaintiff and defendant each call an expert witness, who pres-
ents results of scientifi c studies suggesting that defendant’s 
pills either do (plaintiffs expert) or do not (defendant’s expert) 
increase risk of ovarian cancer. 
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Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the high-severity or low-se-
verity condition. The written instructions (taken from Devitt, Blackmar, Wolff, 
& O’Malley, 1992) informed participants that the study’s purpose was to ad-
dress how people make decisions about legal liability. Important terms, such 
as “liable,” “plaintiff,” and “defendant,” were defi ned, and participants were 
told that any money they awarded was only to compensate the plaintiff for her 
injury. Additionally, they were instructed that
whether or not the plaintiff has suffered actual harm is not at issue-
that is given. What is at issue, and what determines liability, is wheth-
er...the defendant caused the harm. Legally, the plaintiff is not entitled 
to receive any monetary damages for the injury unless it is more likely 
than not that the defendant caused the injury
(i.e., the preponderance of the evidence standard). 
Participants completed the questionnaire individually, though up to fi ve 
participants were included in a single session. The questionnaire took roughly 
30 to 45 min to complete. 
Dependent Variables
Participants answered fi ve questions concerning the case: 
1. Verdict. Should the defendant be found liable (answer Yes or No)? 
2. Causation estimate. On a scale from 0 to 100, “How likely is it that the 
defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury?” A preponderance of the evidence was 
defi ned as any score above 50. The causation scale focused attention on the 
major fact-in-issue and allowed participants to make fi ner assessments of the 
evidence than a dichotomous verdict. 
3. Compensation. Participants were reminded that they could not award 
money to the plaintiff unless they fi rst found the defendant liable, and that 
they should award whatever amount they felt the case warranted. They were 
told further that they could fi nd the defendant liable yet not award any money. 
4 and 5. Sympathy for the plaintiff and defendant. To assess participants, 
feelings toward the litigants, they gave ratings on a scale from –100 to + 100 
in response to the questions “How much sympathy do you feel for the plain-
tiff (defendant)?” They were instructed that negative numbers should be used 
to indicate negative feelings, positive numbers to show positive feelings, and 
0 to refl ect indifference. These questions were included to allow an assess-
ment of the relationship between subjects’ feelings toward the litigants and 
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their liability judgments, and to see if sentiment toward one litigant would af-
fect feelings for the other party. Previous research has found evidence of such 
a spillover effect in feelings toward the major participants at trial (Bornstein, 
1994; Greene, Wilson, & Loftus, 1989). 
Results and Discussion
Seven participants were dropped from the analyses—3 who did not under-
stand the instructions, and 4 for having taken part in a previous pilot version 
of the study—leaving a total of 76 participants (47 males, 29 females). The 
variable of participant gender affected only one of the dependent measures, 
sympathy for the plaintiff, with females feeling more positively toward the 
female plaintiff, t(74) = 2.62, p = .01. Gender did not interact with severity 
on any of the dependent variables. The following analyses are therefore col-
lapsed across participant gender. Cohen’s d and w are included as measures of 
effect size (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991 ). 
Feelings for the Litigants
Participants’ sympathy ratings for both litigants are shown in Table 2. 
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Plaintiff sympathy. The plaintiff whose injury had more severe conse-
quences was perceived in a signifi cantly more positive light, t(74) = 4.29, p < 
001, d = 1.0. Thus, varying the severity of the plaintiffs injury proved to be an 
effective means of manipulating participants’ feelings toward the plaintiff. 
Defendant sympathy. Although the defendant’s behavior and characteristics 
were exactly the same in both conditions, the defendant who was being sued in 
the high-severity condition was perceived signifi cantly less favorably, t(74) = 
2.03, p < .05, d = 0.47. Increasing the amount of positive sentiment felt for one 
party was accompanied by increased negative feelings for that party’s antago-
nist. This reciprocal process is substantiated further by the presence of a nega-
tive correlation between sympathy for the plaintiff and sympathy for the defen-
dant (r = –.24, p < .05). This fi nding suggests that jurors do not perceive the par-
ticipants at trial independently; rather, there is a tradeoff, such that the more fa-
vorably one feels toward one of the opposing sides, the less favorable are one’s 
sentiments toward the other side (Bornstein, 1994; Greene et al., 1989).6
Liability Judgments
Verdicts. Overall, 30.3% of the participants found the defendant liable. Al-
though the factual evidence was identical in both conditions, the proportion of 
plaintiff verdicts differed depending on the severity of her injury. Participants 
were almost twice as likely to fi nd for the plaintiff in the high-severity as in 
the low-severity condition (39.5% vs. 21.1% plaintiff verdicts, respectively), 
χ2 = 3.06, p < .04, one-tailed, w = 0.20. 
Causation ratings. As causation was the major fact-in-issue, it was pre-
dicted that the effect of injury severity on verdicts would be refl ected in terms 
of how participants evaluated the defendant’s behavior in the two conditions. 
Participants rated the likelihood that the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury 
as higher in the high-severity (M = 41.2 on the 0 to 100 scale, SD = 25.8) than 
in the low-severity (M = 26.6, SD = 22.8) condition, t(74) = 2.60, p = .01, d = 
0.60. Participants’ liability judgments thus confi rm the main hypothesis—that 
participants will make different judgments depending upon the severity of the 
plaintiffs injury. As the expert scientifi c evidence on which participants were 
6 An alternative means of assessing the relationship between injury severity and feelings 
for the litigants is to compute the correlation between severity (0 for low, 1 for high) and par-
ticipants’ sympathy ratings. This procedure facilitates a comparison of the effects. Severi-
ty was positively correlated with sympathy for the plaintiff (r = .45, p < .001) and negative-
ly correlated with sympathy for the defendant (r = –.23, p < .05). These fi ndings corroborate 
the primary analyses reported in the text, while also indicating that the severity manipulation 
had a greater impact on participants’ perceptions of the plaintiff than on their perceptions of 
the defendant. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this comparison. 
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told to base their causation judgments was identical in the two conditions, the 
effect of severity on these judgments suggests that participants evaluated the 
same evidence differently, depending on severity. Because participants made 
a global estimate of causation and did not evaluate the scientifi c evidence di-
rectly in reaching a verdict, the present fi ndings cannot address the process by 
which severity infl uences the evaluation of evidence. Future research is called 
for that addresses jurors’ cognitive processes in evaluating scientifi c evidence 
(cf. Smith, Penrod, Otto, & Park, 1996). 
Compensation
Injury severity and sentiments have been found to correlate positively with 
damage awards in both simulated (Darden, DeConinck, Babin, & Griffi n, 
1991) and actual cases (e.g., Genn, 1984 ). The effect appears to be stronger 
for some types of cases than for others (Bovbjerg, Sloan, nor, & Hsieh, 1991 
), and extralegal factors may come into playas well (Baron & Ritov, 1993; 
Goodman, Greene, & Loftus, 1989). As the main goal of compensation is res-
titution for the injury, if participants award more money to more severely in-
jured plaintiffs—once liability has been established—then they are behaving 
in a normative, legally appropriate manner. Compensation awards were ana-
lyzed only for participants who fi rst found the defendant liable. Although par-
ticipants awarded considerably more money to more severely injured plain-
tiffs (Ms = $7.78 million vs. $275,000; Mdns = $400,000 vs. $300,000), the 
difference was not signifi cant, t(13, separate variances) = 1.06. 
The failure to attain signifi cance is likely due to a combination of small 
sample size (only 23 of 76 participants found the defendant liable and hence 
could award compensation) and extremely high variance in the awards (the 
amounts ranged from hundreds of dollars to $10 million). The absence of an 
effect of severity on compensation awards also shows that the requested com-
pensation can elicit a powerful anchoring and adjustment effect (Chapman & 
Bornstein, 1996; Raitz, Greene, Goodman, & Loftus, 1990). Requested com-
pensation was held constant across the severity conditions so that participants 
would not draw from it inferences about the legitimacy of the plaintiffs factu-
al claims; however, it might have had the inadvertent effect of anchoring par-
ticipants on the requested amount to such an extent that they did not make al-
lowance for the severity of the plaintiffs injury. 
Relationship of Severity and Sentiment to Causation Ratings
To show that the effect of injury severity on causation judgments is me-
diated by the variation in feelings toward the litigants elicited by the differ-
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ent severity conditions, a multiple regression analysis was performed to mea-
sure the extent to which differences in sympathy ratings, rather than outcome 
severity alone, accounted for differences in causation judgments. As predict-
ed, regressing participants’ causation estimates onto the plaintiff’s injury se-
verity and sympathy ratings for the plaintiff and the defendant was signifi -
cant (adjusted R2 = .27), overall F(3, 72) = 10.38, p < .001. However, signifi -
cant contributions to the model were made only by sympathy for the plaintiff 
(B = 0.17, SE = 0.06, p < .01) and sympathy for the defendant (B = –0.25, SE 
= 0.08, p < .01 ), and not by severity in and of itself (p > .5). Thus, if variation 
in feelings toward both litigants is held constant, outcome severity alone plays 
no role in the variation in causation judgments. 
This analysis suggests that the effect of injury severity on participants’ 
evaluation of the evidence is mediated by the sentiments aroused by differ-
ent levels of severity. However, because participants made their sympathy rat-
ings after judging causation, it is possible that their sentiments were infl u-
enced by their causation judgments, rather than vice versa. Although the pres-
ent analysis cannot defi nitively rule out this possibility, it is less likely than 
the mediational account, for two reasons. First, pilot data obtained in develop-
ing the present stimulus materials yielded an equally large difference in sym-
pathy ratings due to injury severity, even when participants did not judge cau-
sation. Second, it is harder to envision the process by which severity would 
infl uence causation judgments directly, as opposed to being mediated by vari-
ations in sentiments toward the litigants. 
The results of Study 1 indicate that varying the severity of the plaintiff’s 
injury elicited different sentiments, which biased participants’ evaluation of 
the evidence so that it favored the more severely injured plaintiff, who was 
consequently more likely to win her case. Injury severity affected feelings to-
ward both the plaintiff and the defendant, and feelings toward both litigants 
had an extralegal infl uence on participants’ liability judgments. 
Study 2
Although Study 1 clearly demonstrates an effect of injury severity on par-
ticipants’ factual judgments, it does not address how the effect operates. One 
explanation is that severity could relate to some relevant prior belief. For ex-
ample, Bornstein (1994) found that participants’ tendency to treat civil de-
fendants differently as a function of their status (i.e., a corporation vs. an in-
dividual) refl ected a general belief that corporate defendants were more like-
ly to cause harm, other factors being equal. In the case of injury severity, ju-
rors might feel that a particular action by a defendant is simply more likely to 
cause a severe than a mild injury. If so, the extralegal factor of injury severi-
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ty would then be used as a piece of evidence in making the decision and could 
explain why it infl uenced liability judgments in Study 1. 
Alternatively, severity could infl uence jurors’ decisions solely by virtue 
of its relationship to their feelings. The analysis of Study 1 established that 
injury severity in and of itself did not infl uence participants’ liability judg-
ments; rather, its effect was mediated by the feelings aroused by different de-
grees of injury. Different emotional states are associated with different mo-
tives or action tendencies (Frijda, 1987; Frijda et al., 1989). Since the extent 
of the plaintiffs injury affected participants’ feelings toward both the plaintiff 
and the defendant, and both of these sentiments infl uenced their liability judg-
ments, there are two distinct action tendencies that could be involved. A se-
vere injury that arouses positive sentiment for the plaintiff might be associat-
ed with a specifi c motivational state to help the plaintiff by alleviating her suf-
fering (Batson et al., 1983, 1987), while the same injury’s arousal of negative 
feelings toward the defendant could produce a motivational state to punish the 
allegedly responsible party. In either case, the goal can only be achieved by 
evaluating the evidence in a direction favoring the plaintiff and fi nding the de-
fendant liable. 
Study 2 was designed to investigate further the exact nature of the rela-
tionship between injury severity and judgments of liability and compensation. 
If greater severity leads to a specifi c motivation to see the severely injured 
party compensated or to punish the person allegedly responsible, then differ-
ent levels of injury severity will affect participants’ judgments only when they 
have the power to compensate or to punish. If, on the other hand, participants 
have a prior belief concerning causation and injury severity, it will be refl ect-
ed in their liability judgments whenever injury severity varies. 
Study 2 is a replication and extension of Study 1. In addition to the normal 
trial situation, where jurors are in a position to determine both liability and the 
amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff (Norm condition), 
two other decision contexts are used. In the fi rst of these two conditions (sep-
arated trial, or Sep condition), participants determined liability and punitive 
damages against the defendant, but these damages were not to be paid to the 
plaintiff, as is customary in civil suits; furthermore, participants did not award 
compensatory damages to the plaintiff (modeled after Baron & Ritov, 1993 ). 
Thus, participants in this condition were not in a position to award any money 
to the plaintiff, but they could punish the defendant. The second new condi-
tion was a Control condition in which participants’ task was only to evaluate 
the evidence and to determine liability; they awarded no damages of any sort. 
For all three conditions, or decision contexts, injury severity was varied. 
It is hypothesized that because injury severity affects participants’ feelings 
toward the litigants, a more severe injury will induce a stronger motivation-
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al state; therefore, injury severity will infl uence participants’ liability judg-
ments only when they are in a position to act upon that motivation by award-
ing damages—that is, in the Norm and Sep conditions. Participants’ liability 
judgments in the Control condition, where they are unable to award damag-
es, will not differ as a function of severity. Although participants’ task in the 
Norm condition emphasizes compensating the plaintiff, the compensation is 
nonetheless paid by the defendant. Hence, traditional compensation has the 
dual effects of punishing the defendant, by his incurring a fi nancial loss, as 
well as providing restitution to the plaintiff (Landes & Posner, 1987). Com-
pensation can thereby satisfy both possible motives: to help the plaintiff and 
to punish the defendant. The Sep condition, on the other hand, allows only 
punishment of the defendant. A secondary hypothesis is thus that the effect of 
severity will be stronger in the Norm than in the Sep condition. 
Method
Participants
Participants were 160 undergraduates who received extra course credit. 
Although demographic information such as race and age was not requested 
of participants, the larger sample from which they were drawn was predom-
inantly White (~90%) and between the ages of 18 and 25 (the limitations of 
the sample are discussed in the General Discussion section). Four participants 
failed to follow instructions, leaving a total of 156 participants (47 male, 108 
female, and 1 participant who did not indicate gender). 
Materials and Design
The same case, with a high- and low-severity condition, was used as in 
Study 1. The design was a 2 × 3 (Injury Severity × Decision Context) be-
tween-subjects design. Twenty-six participants were randomly assigned to 
each condition. 
Procedure
The fi rst part of the instructions was similar to those used in Study 1. The 
remainder of the one-page instruction sheet differed depending on which de-
cision context the subject was in. Instructions for the Norm condition were 
the same as in Study 1. In the remaining two decision contexts, participants 
were told (modeled after Baron & Ritov, 1993): 
Imagine . . . that a few years from now, the U.S. has a new law con-
cerning medical misfortunes, such as injuries or diseases. According to 
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this law, anyone who suffers such a misfortune can request monetary 
damages. . . For each request, two questions will be decided separate-
ly, each by a different panel. 
The fi rst panel will decide whether the defendant will be fi ned, and, if 
so, how much. All fi nes go into a government fund, not to the plaintiff. 
The panel that decides the fi nes considers only the justice of impos-
ing the fi nes, which depends on whether the defendant actually caused 
the harm. 
The second panel will decide how much money the plaintiff will re-
ceive. If any monetary damages are paid, the government pays them 
out of the fund, not the defendant. This panel takes into account only 
the situation of the injured plaintiff . . .The government does not have 
to break even in the long run. The injured person can ask for money no 
matter what caused the misfortune. The panels operate independently. 
Participants in the Sep condition were then told to imagine that they were 
on the fi rst panel, while participants in the Control condition were told to 
imagine that they were not on either panel. Control participants were told 
that their task was neither to fi ne the defendant nor to compensate the plain-
tiff, but instead to provide an objective baseline from which to evaluate the 
accuracy of others’ judgments. Thus, participants in all three decision con-
texts were asked to evaluate the evidence and to determine liability by esti-
mating how likely the defendant was to have caused the plaintiffs injury. The 
conditions differed in the type of monetary judgment participants were asked 
to make. 
Participants completed questionnaires individually, with up to 10 people 
included in a single session. Following completion of the questionnaire, they 
fi lled out a survey which asked them about the extent to which their beliefs 
infl uenced their responses; specifi cally, they were asked if their feelings to-
ward the litigants in the particular case infl uenced their judgments, and if they 
should, in general, for real jurors. These questions were included to assess 
whether participants were aware of the potential infl uence of extralegal fac-
tors on their judgments. After completing the feedback survey, participants 
were thanked and debriefed. The entire procedure took roughly 30 to 45 min 
to complete. 
As in Study 1, participants reached a verdict, estimated the probability that 
the defendant caused the plaintiffs injury, awarded damages (if appropriate), 
and rated their feelings toward the litigants. 
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Results and Discussion
As in Study 1, the only effect of participant gender was on ratings of sym-
pathy for the plaintiff, with females feeling marginally more positive, F(1, 
151) = 3.61, p < .06. A signifi cant interaction between gender and severi-
ty, F(1, 151) = 5.45, p < .05, indicated that this gender difference in feelings 
toward the plaintiff was confi ned to the severely injured plaintiff. As there 
were no other effects of participant gender, the following results are collapsed 
across gender. 
Feelings for the Litigants
Participants’ sympathy ratings were analyzed by separate 2 × 3 (Injury Se-
verity × Decision Context) ANOVAs. The severity-of-injury manipulation was 
again very effective at eliciting different amounts of sympathy (Table 2). Par-
ticipants felt more positively toward the severely injured plaintiff; F(1, 150) = 
48.46, p < .001, d = 1.14, and they felt more negatively toward the defendant 
who had allegedly caused the more severe injury, F(1, 150) = 5.27, p < .025, 
d = 0.38.7 There was no main effect of decision context on sympathy ratings, 
nor did it interact with severity. 
Liability Judgments
It was hypothesized that severity would infl uence liability judgments in 
the Norm and Sep conditions, but not in the Control condition. These specif-
ic hypotheses allow for planned comparisons on the effect of severity with-
in each decision context. In addition, it was hypothesized that the effect of se-
verity on liability judgments would be greater in the Norm condition, where 
participants could compensate the plaintiff directly, than in the Sep condition, 
where they could punish the defendant but not compensate the plaintiff. This 
interaction was tested by logistic regression, for the dichotomous verdict data, 
and with a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the continuous causation ratings. 
Verdicts. The proportion of liable (i.e., plaintiff) verdicts in each condi-
tion is shown in Table 3. The effect of injury severity was signifi cant within 
the Norm and Sep conditions, χ2(df = 1, N = 52) = 8.31 and 4.46, respectively; 
ps < 05, ws = 0.23, 0.17, where participants awarded damages, but not with-
7 As in Study 1, correlational analyses were also performed. Injury severity was posi-
tively correlated with sympathy for the plaintiff (r = .49, p < .001), but negatively correlat-
ed with sympathy for the defendant (r = –.18, p < .05); as in Study 1, the relative magni-
tude of the correlations suggests a stronger effect of severity on feelings for the plaintiff. 
1492             BORNSTEIN IN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 28 (1998)
in the Control condition, χ2(df = 1, N = 52) < 0.5. Regressing verdicts onto in-
jury severity and decision context, including only the Norm and Sep condi-
tions, yielded a signifi cant contribution of severity (B = 0.96, SE = 0.30, p = 
.001) but a nonsignifi cant interaction (p > .5), indicating that the effect of se-
verity was equally strong in the Norm and Sep conditions. These fi ndings sug-
gest that injury severity is associated with a strong motivational component, 
and that it will affect jurors’ verdicts only when they can award damages. Fur-
ther, the motives aroused by a severe injury can be satisfi ed equally well by 
compensating the plaintiff or punishing the defendant. 
Causation. Within each decision context (Figure 1), planned contrasts 
showed that greater injury severity infl uenced participants’ evaluation of the 
evidence in a direction favorable to the plaintiff in the Norm condition, F(1, 
150) = 9.74, p < .005, d = 0.51; marginally in the Sep condition, F(1, 150) = 
3.01, p = .085, d = 0.28; but had no effect on participants in the Control con-
dition, F(1, 150) = 1.84, p > .17. A two-way ANOVA with severity and deci-
sion context (Norm or Sep) as the independent variables yielded a signifi cant 
effect of severity, F(1, 100) = 11.34, p < .001, d = 0.67, but a nonsignifi cant 
interaction, F < 1. 
Although the differential feelings for the litigants elicited in the high-se-
verity versus the low-severity condition were the same in all decision con-
texts, participants’ liability judgments varied only in the Norm and Sep con-
ditions, where they could award damages. This fi nding suggests that partic-
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ipants were not relying on a prior belief about causation and injury severi-
ty but were displaying motivated behavior. Participants who could compen-
sate the injured plaintiff or punish the defendant were more likely to be infl u-
enced by injury severity than were those who could not. Feelings aroused by 
a severe injury appear to operate by producing a specifi c motivation to allevi-
ate the injured party’s suffering or, to a somewhat lesser extent, to punish the 
defendant. In order to accomplish either of these goals, participants must fi rst 
fi nd the defendant liable. Because the motivations associated with feelings for 
the litigants are stronger when the plaintiff has been more severely injured, in-
jury severity consequently has a greater effect in circumstances where partic-
ipants have the opportunity to act by awarding damages. Contrary to expecta-
tion, even though both ends were served in the Norm condition, the effect of 
injury severity on participants’ liability judgments was equally strong whether 
they were awarding compensatory or purely punitive damages. 
Monetary Damages
The different conditions asked different questions regarding monetary 
damages: Participants in the Norm condition compensated plaintiffs directly, 
those in the Sep condition fi ned defendants but did not compensate plaintiffs, 
and Control participants made no judgments involving money. Analyses were 
therefore performed within the fi rst two conditions to evaluate the effect of in-
jury severity on both kinds of awards. As in Study 1, damage awards tended 
to be larger when the plaintiff was more severely hurt. This trend was appar-
ent both when the plaintiff was compensated directly (Norm Ms = $609,000 
vs. $375,000, Mdns = $300,000 vs. $375,000) and when the defendant was 
Figure 1. Causation judgments as a function of injury severity and decision context. 
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fi ned but the plaintiff did not receive the damages herself (Sep Ms = $587,500 
vs. $175,000, Mdns = $500,000 vs. $175,000). The difference was signifi cant 
in the Sep, t(5.9, separate variances) = 3.14, p < .025, but not in the Norm 
condition, t(8.3, separate variances) = 0.94. However, as few subjects found 
the defendant liable in the low-severity condition—only two participants in 
each decision context where damages were awarded—these statistical com-
parisons must be interpreted cautiously. Future research is needed in which 
participant jurors award damages in both high- and low-severity cases where 
the defendant’s liability has already been established. Nonetheless, these re-
sults suggest that participant jurors were infl uenced by the variable of injury 
severity both when it was relevant (i.e., in awarding compensation) and when 
it was not, in merely punishing the defendant. 
Participants’ Beliefs About the Infl uence of Feelings on Their Judgments
After responding to the case, participants were asked whether their feel-
ings toward the litigants infl uenced their liability judgments. In addition, they 
were asked whether jurors in general should be infl uenced by their feelings 
toward litigants. For each question, participants responded “Yes,” “No,” or 
“Maybe/Unsure.” For the following analyses, Yes and Maybe responses were 
combined into a single category in order to avoid having too few participants 
in some cells (including them as separate response categories yielded compa-
rable results ). 
Approximately one quarter of participants (26.3%) said that their liability 
judgments were or might have been infl uenced by how they felt, while 22.7% 
of participants believed that, in general, jurors’ causation judgments should 
defi nitely or perhaps be infl uenced by their feelings toward the litigants. Par-
ticipants were more likely to report an infl uence of sentiment on their own 
judgments if they believed that it should infl uence actual jurors, χ2(df = 1, N = 
156) = 25.83; p < .001, w = 0.41. 
Participants’ self-reports were reliable predictors of their liability judg-
ments. Participants were more likely to fi nd the defendant liable when they 
responded that they had (or might have been) infl uenced by their feelings 
(46.3% liable verdicts) than when they had not been (13.9% liable verdict), 
χ2(df = 1, N = 156) = 18.26, p < .001, w = 0.34, and also when they believed 
jurors in general ought to consider sentiment in reaching a verdict (37.1 % vs. 
18.5% liable verdicts), χ2(df = 1, N = 156) = 5.36, p < .025, w = 0.19. A simi-
lar pattern of results was obtained using participants’ causation judgments as 
the dependent variable: Participants who reported being infl uenced by their 
feelings or who believed that jurors in general should consider their feelings 
rated the defendant as more likely to have caused the plaintiffs injury than 
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those who did not, F(1, 152) = 14.07, p < .001,d = 0.61, and F(1, 150) = 9.41, 
p < .005, d = 0.50, respectively. 
Overall, participants’ self-reported beliefs contradicted their actual behav-
ior. Although 73.7% of participants claimed that extralegal sentiment did not 
infl uence their judgments, and 77.3% said that it should not, the results indi-
cate that feelings toward the litigants had a powerful effect on participants’ 
evaluation of the evidence. Participants’ self-reports were reliable indexes of 
their behavior, such that those who reported being infl uenced by their feelings 
actually were; that is, they were more likely to favor the plaintiff than were 
participants who denied being infl uenced by their feelings. 
In summary, the results of Study 2 indicate that the effect of injury severi-
ty on participants’ factual judgments is mediated by the opportunity to award 
compensation or to punish the defendant. Relatively severe injuries elicit a de-
sire to compensate the plaintiff, to punish the defendant, or both; when these 
desires can be satisfi ed by a certain interpretation of the evidence, injury se-
verity consequently infl uences participants’ liability judgments that are based 
on their evaluation of the evidence. This pattern is particularly true for partici-
pants who are aware that their feelings are affecting their judgments. Since an 
effect of injury severity on liability judgments not only violates legal guide-
lines but also occurs in the absence of a relevant expectation, it constitutes a 
decision-making bias. The effect of severity is equally strong whether partic-
ipants’ damage awards are paid to the plaintiff or not, but removing their ca-
pacity to award any damages reduces the bias. 
General Discussion
Participants did not use the evidence presented at trial strictly as intend-
ed by the law. Effect size indexes in Study 1 showed a medium-sized effect of 
the severity of the plaintiffs injury on participants’ liability judgments (Rosen-
thal & Rosnow, 1991 ), indicating a fairly substantial infl uence of this ex-
tralegal factor. However, a severe injury was not suffi cient, in and of itself, 
to sway participants’ judgments. A relatively severely injured plaintiff was 
viewed more favorably than a less severely injured plaintiff. A more severe 
injury also caused the defendant to be perceived correspondingly less favor-
ably, even though the defendant’s behavior was identical, regardless of the in-
jury’s consequences. Study 1 established that the infl uence of injury severity 
was mediated by its effect on participants’ feelings toward both litigants. This 
result supports previous research showing that feelings for the various par-
ticipants at trial infl uence one another (Bornstein, 1994; Greene et al., 1989), 
and that these sentiments can infl uence jurors’ interpretation of the evidence 
(Bornstein, 1994; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). 
1496             BORNSTEIN IN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 28 (1998)
Study 2 extended this fi nding by showing that variations in the severity of 
the plaintiff’s injury affected liability judgments only when participants could 
award damages. One explanation of this fi nding is that the sentiments aroused 
by a severe injury induce a particular action tendency (Frijda, 1987; Frijda 
et al., 1989), in this case to help the plaintiff by awarding compensation, or 
to punish the defendant by awarding a fi ne. Although compensatory damages 
take money from the defendant as well as provide restitution to the plaintiff, 
injury severity does not appear to motivate behavior more strongly in this cir-
cumstance than when punitive damages are awarded without the money go-
ing to the plaintiff. If neither action tendency can be satisfi ed, as in the control 
condition where participants did not award any damages, then severity does 
not affect liability judgments. Thus, the effect of severity on liability judg-
ments supports fi ndings from the motivation and emotion literature that a ma-
jor component of emotional experience is the tendency to act in a certain way 
(e.g., Frijda et al., 1989). Emotions aroused within the context of a trial can 
have the same general effects as emotions aroused in other situations. 
Various approaches to the study of juror decision making have in common 
a view of jurors’ task as involving the weighing of different kinds of informa-
tion in assessing the relative likelihood of competing hypotheses (e.g., Hastie, 
1993; Kaye, 1988). As a number of cognitive biases tend to occur in complex 
decision-making situations generally (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), they 
can be expected to affect jurors’ reasoning as well (Arkes, 1989; Saks & Kidd, 
1980). For example, jurors demonstrate hindsight bias when the outcome of 
some behavior infl uences their evaluation of evidence on which the behavior, 
such as a possibly illegal police search, was based (Casper & Benedict, 1993 ). 
Juror hindsight bias differs slightly from the effect of injury severity dem-
onstrated in the present studies in that hindsight subjects are infl uenced by 
knowledge of whether or not an event has occurred (or which of alternative 
events has occurred), while in personal-injury cases, a single, specifi c event 
has occurred (i.e., the injury) which can vary in its consequences. For practi-
cal purposes, however, this distinction makes little difference; in both instanc-
es, jurors’ judgments about facts-in-issue are infl uenced by outcome informa-
tion that is legally irrelevant, though it might be relevant to other judgments, 
such as the awarding of damages. 
Because of the similarity between hindsight bias and the effect of inju-
ry severity, proposed techniques for reducing their effects are similar as well 
(Wexler & Schopp, 1989). For example, judges’ instructions could emphasize 
that jurors should not be infl uenced by their feelings toward the litigants. This 
proposal would require little change from current procedure, as jurors are usu-
ally already told to consider only the formally presented evidence and to ex-
clude any prior prejudices (Devitt et al., 1992). In combating the infl uence of 
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jurors’ sentiments, judges could make this point even more strongly, and per-
haps even single out specifi c factors likely to arouse sentiment, such as the 
presence of a severe injury. However, because merely warning people about 
a possible bias has failed at eliminating the effects of other cognitive biases, 
such as hindsight (Casper & Benedict, 1993; Fischhoff, 1982), this technique 
is unlikely to be successful. 
A more radical proposal for eliminating the effect of extralegal factors on 
jurors’ factual judgments, which would involve a greater departure from nor-
mal judicial procedure, would be to separate civil trials into two distinct, in-
dependent phases: a fact-fi nding phase and a damages phase, involving sepa-
rate decision-making bodies whose decisions are not contingent on one anoth-
er. Separating claims or issues at trial is permitted by Rule 42(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and has been proposed as one means of improv-
ing the quality of juror decision making, especially in complex cases (Cecil, 
Hans, & Wiggins, 1991; Hammitt, Carroll, & Relies, 1985). This approach is 
suggested by the results of Study 2, in which severity infl uenced participants’ 
evaluations of the evidence only when they were in a position to award dam-
ages. Bifurcated trials would thus produce fairer decisions by eliminating the 
infl uence of this extralegal variable, and possibly others as well. Furthermore, 
bifurcation would not necessarily work to the disadvantage of one party or the 
other. Horowitz and Bordens (1990) found that in a simulated toxic tort trial, 
separation of the issues resulted in fewer verdicts for the plaintiff, but larger 
damage awards if the defendant was fi rst found liable. 
The effect of injury severity differs from hindsight bias in that the emotional 
response produced by variations in severity is the critical determinant of its ef-
fect on liability judgments. Thus, a prescriptive approach specifi c to the factor 
of severity could address the issue of jurors’ feelings. One technique for deal-
ing with jurors’ sentiments is to attempt to “desensitize” potential jurors by hav-
ing the injured plaintiff appear during jury selection (Green, 1990). In Study 
2, participants who reported having been infl uenced by how they felt toward 
the litigants were more likely to fi nd the defendant liable. This result suggests 
that presenting the plaintiff’s injuries during voir dire, and asking jurors if they 
felt that those injuries would unduly infl uence their appraisal of the factual evi-
dence, would be an effective means of reducing the injuries’ potentially biasing 
effect. Such a procedure has very little cost, as plaintiffs frequently appear at the 
voir dire anyway. It is important to note that removing such jurors would not be 
prejudicial to the plaintiff; injury severity could, and presumably still would, be 
used in determining compensation, for which it is legally relevant. 
In recommending corrective procedures based on generalizing from the 
present results to the behavior of real jurors, it is important to highlight the 
major differences between the present methodology and actual trials. The 
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participants in the present studies were not actual jurors, and they read a 
brief summary of a trial, rather than being presented with a cognitively much 
more demanding live trial. Furthermore, an undergraduate student sample is 
not representative of a community-wide jury pool; it is unusually homoge-
neous in terms of race, age, and socioeconomic status. It is diffi cult to know 
the extent to which the results of such simulations can be applied to court-
room situations (Bray & Kerr, 1982). For example, student jurors might dif-
fer from a more representative sample of jury-eligible adults in coming dis-
proportionately from relatively high-income groups or in their view of what 
constitutes a lot or a little money in terms of damages. Although the behav-
ior of student mock jurors has not been shown to differ systematically from 
that of nonstudents, variables that covary with student status—such as race, 
income, and education level—can affect mock jurors’ use of extralegal in-
formation (Bornstein & Rajki, 1994). Thus, it is not known if injury severi-
ty would infl uence jurors drawn from a more diverse population in the same 
way as participants in the present studies; its effects could be greater, less, 
or the same. 
Although the manipulation of injury severity might have stood out more in 
the brief experimental descriptions than it would have in a richer, more com-
plex trial, little research has been conducted on the effect of using simulations 
with varying degrees of verisimilitude, and that which has been done offers 
confl icting results (e.g., Bermant, McGuire, McKinley, & Salo, 1974; Juhnke 
et al., 1979). Importantly, even if a simulation’s verisimilitude did have a con-
sistent main effect (e.g., a greater proportion of plaintiff verdicts in more re-
alistic trials), it does not necessarily follow that this variable would interact 
with other variables of interest (cf. Kramer & Kerr, 1989)—that is, there is no 
reason to predict that the effect of injury severity would be either greater or 
less with a videotaped simulation, as opposed to a written summary. 
Thus, despite these limitations, and taken with a proper degree of caution, 
the present results have potential applications to legal practice. Of course, 
any modifi cation of existing judicial procedures has costs as well as bene-
fi ts (Saks, 1989). For example, trying issues before two entirely different ju-
ries has the disadvantage of requiring more expense, time, and jurors (for a 
more detailed discussion of the tradeoffs involved in bifurcation, see Wexler 
& Schopp, 1989). Depending on the outcome of future studies exploring the 
effi cacy of less disruptive attempts to eradicate the effect of cognitive bias-
es on juror decision making, such as judges’ instructions and voir dire, bifur-
cation merits serious consideration. The benefi ts to the jury system of reduc-
ing the infl uence of extralegal factors, such as the severity of a plaintiffs inju-
ry, must be weighed against the increased costs in time, money, and encum-
bering the trial process. 
EFFECT OF INJURY SEVERITY ON LIABILITY JUDGMENTS                   1499
References
Arkes, H. R. (1989). Principles in judgment/decision making research pertinent to le-
gal proceedings. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 7, 429–456. 
Baron, J., & Ritov, I. (1993). Intuitions about penalties and compensation in the con-
text of tort law. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7, 17–33. 
Batson, D. D., Fultz, J., & Schoenrade, P. A. (1987). Adults’ emotional reactions to the 
distress of others. In N. Eisenberg & J. Strayer (Eds. ), Empathy and its develop-
ment (pp. 163–184). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Batson,C. D., O’Quin, K., Fultz, J., Vanderplas, M., & Isen, A. M. (1983). Infl uence of 
self-reported distress and empathy on egoistic versus altruistic motivation to help. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 706–718. 
Bermant, G., McGuire, M., McKinley, W., & Salo, C. (1974). The logic of simulation 
in jury research. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 1, 224–233. 
Bornstein, B. H. (1994). David, Goliath, and Reverend Bayes: Prior beliefs about de-
fendants’ status in personal injury cases. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 8, 233–
258. 
Bornstein, B. H., & Rajki, M. (1994). Extra-legal factors and product liability: The in-
fl uence of mock jurors’ demographic characteristics and intuitions about the cause 
of an injury. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 12, 127–147. 
Bovbjerg, R. R., Sloan, F. A., Dor, A., & Hsieh, C. R. (1991 ). Juries and justice: Are 
malpractice and other personal injuries created equal? Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 54, 5–41. 
Bray, R. M., & Kerr, N. L. (1982). Methodological considerations in the study of the 
psychology of the courtroom. In N. L. Kerr & R. M. Bray (Eds.), The psychology 
of the courtroom (pp. 287–323). New York, NY: Academic. 
Burger, J. M. (1981 ). Motivational biases in the attribution of responsibility for an ac-
cident: A meta-analysis of the defensive-attribution hypothesis. Psychological Bul-
letin, 90, 496–512. 
Calfee, J. E., & Winston, C. (1988). Economic aspects of liability rules and liability in-
surance. In R. E. Litan & C. Winston (Eds.), Liability: Perspective and policy (pp. 
16–41). Washington, DC: Brookings. 
Casper, J. D., & Benedict, K. M. (1993). The infl uence of outcome information and at-
titudes on juror decision making in search and seizure cases. In R. Hastie (Ed.), In-
side the juror (pp. 65–83 ). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Cather, C., Greene, E., & Durham, R. (1996). Plaintiff injury and defendant reprehen-
sibility: Implications for compensatory and punitive damage awards. Law and Hu-
man Behavior, 20, 189–205. 
1500             BORNSTEIN IN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 28 (1998)
Cecil, J. S., Hans, V. P., & Wiggins, E. C. (1991). Citizen comprehension of diffi cult 
issues: Lessons from civil jury trials. American University Law Review, 40, 727–
774. 
Chapman, G. B., & Bornstein, B. H. (1996). The more you ask for, the more you get: 
Anchoring in personal injury verdicts. Applied Cognitive psychology, 10, 519–540. 
Chin, A., & Peterson, M. (1985). Deep pockets, empty pockets. who wins in Cook 
County jury trials. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation. 
Clore, G. L. (1994). Why emotions vary in intensity. In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson 
(Eds.), The nature of emotion (pp. 386–393). New York, NY: Oxford Universi-
ty Press. 
Cruse, D., & Leigh, B. C. (1987). “Adam’s Rib” revisited: Legal and non-legal infl u-
ences on the processing of trial testimony. Social Behaviour, 2, 221–230. 
Dane, F. C., & Wrightsman, L. S. (1982). Effects of defendants’ and victims’ charac-
teristics on jurors’ verdicts. In N. L. Kerr & R. M. Bray (Eds. ), The psychology of 
the courtroom (pp. 83–115). New York, NY: Academic. 
Darden, W. R., DeConinck, J. B., Babin, B. J., & Griffi n, M. (1991). The role of con-
sumer sympathy in product liability suits: An experimental investigation of loose 
coupling. Journal of Business Research, 22, 65–89. 
Davis, J. H. (1989). Psychology and law: The last fi fteen years. Journal of Applied So-
cial Psychology, 19, 199–230. 
Devitt, E. J., Blackmar, C. B., Wolff, M. A., & O’Malley, K. F. (1992). Federal jury 
practice and instructions: Civil and criminal (4th ed., Vol. 1). St. Paul, MN: West. 
Fincham, F. D., & Jaspars, J. (1980). Attribution of responsibility: From man the sci-
entist to man as lawyer. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 14, pp. 81–138). New York, NY: Academic. 
Fischhoff, B. (1982). Debiasing. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), 
Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 422–444 ). Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Frijda, N. H. (1987). Emotion, cognitive structure, and action tendency. Cognition and 
Emotion, 1, 115–143. 
Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, apprais-
al, and emotional action readiness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
57, 212–228. 
Genn, H. (1984). Who claims compensation: Factors associated with claiming and ob-
taining damages. In D. Harris, M. Maclean, H. Genn, S. Lloyd-Bostock, P. Fenn, 
P. Corfi eld, & Y. Brittan (Eds. ), Compensation and support for illness and injury 
(pp. 46–79). Oxford, UK: Clarendon. 
Goodman, J., Greene, E., & Loftus, E. F. (1989). Runaway verdicts or reasoned deter-
EFFECT OF INJURY SEVERITY ON LIABILITY JUDGMENTS                   1501
minations: Mock juror strategies in awarding damages. Jurimetrics Journal, 29, 
285–309. 
Green, W. E. (1990, April 18). Attorneys try to defuse sympathy in injury cases. The 
Wall Street Journal, p. B1. 
Greene, E., Wilson, L., & Loftus, E. F. (1989). Impact of hypnotic testimony on the 
jury. Law and Human Behavior, 13, 61–78. 
Hammitt, J. K., Carroll, S. J., & Relies, D. S. (1985). Tort standards and jury decisions. 
Journal of Legal Studies, 14, 751–762. 
Hans, V. P., & Ermann, M. D. (1989). Responses to corporate versus individual wrong-
doing. Law and Human Behavior, 13, 151–166. 
Hart, H. L. A., & Honore, T. (1985). Causation in the law (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Clar-
endon. 
Hastie, R. (1993). Introduction. In R. Hastie (Ed.), Inside the juror (pp. 3–41). Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Horowitz, I. A., & Bordens, K. S. (1988). The effects of outlier presence, plaintiff pop-
ulation size and aggregation of plaintiffs on simulated civil jury decisions. Law 
and Human Behavior, 12, 209–229. 
Horowitz, I. A., & Bordens, K. S. (1990). An experimental investigation of procedural 
issues in complex tort trials. Law and Human Behavior, 14, 269–285. 
Huber, P. W. (1988). Liability: The legal revolution and its consequences. New York, 
NY: Basic Books. 
Juhnke, R., Vought, C., Pyszczynski, T., Dane, F., Losure, B., & Wrightsman, L. 
(1979). Effects of presentation mode upon mock jurors’ reactions to a trial. Per-
sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5, 36–39. 
Kalven, H., & Zeisel, H. (1966). The American jury. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. 
Kaye, D. H. (1988). What is Bayesianism? In P. Tillers & E. D. Green (Eds.), Proba-
bility and inference in the law of evidence (pp. 1–19). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 
Kluwer. 
Kramer, G. P., & Kerr, N. L. (1989). Laboratory simulation and bias in the study of ju-
ror behavior: A methodological note. Law and Human Behavior, 13, 89–99. 
Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (1987). The economic structure of tort law. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Leeper, R. W. (1963 ). The motivational theory of emotion. In C. L. Stacey & M. F. 
DeMartino (Eds.), In understanding human motivation (rev. ed., pp. 657–665). 
Cleveland, OH: Howard Allen. 
Phares, E. J., & Wilson, K. G. (1972). Responsibility attribution: The role of outcome 
severity, situational ambiguity, and internal-external control. Journal of Personal-
ity, 40, 392–406. 
1502             BORNSTEIN IN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 28 (1998)
Raitz, A., Greene, E., Goodman, J., & Loftus, E. F. (1990). Determining damages: The 
infl uence of expert testimony on jurors’ decision making. Law and Human Behav-
ior, 14, 385–395. 
Reskin, B. F., & Visher, C. A. (1986). The impacts of evidence and extralegal factors 
in jurors’ decisions. Law and Society Review, 20, 423–438. 
Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. (1991). Essentials of behavioral research (2nd ed.). 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Saks, M. J. (1989). Legal policy analysis and evaluation. American Psychologist, 44, 
1110–1117. 
Saks, M. J., & Kidd, R. F. (1980). Human information processing and adjudication: 
Trial by heuristics. Law and Society Review, 15, 123–160. 
Sigall, H., & Ostrove, N. (1975). Beautiful but dangerous: Effects of offender attrac-
tiveness and nature of the crime on juridic judgment. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 31, 410–414. 
Smith, B. C., Penrod, S. D., Otto, A. L., & Park, R. C. (1996). Jurors’ use of probabi-
listic evidence. Law and Human Behavior, 20, 49–82. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Decision making under uncertainty: Heuristics 
and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131. 
Vidmar, N. (1993). Empirical evidence on the deep pockets hypothesis: Jury awards 
for pain and suffering in medical malpractice cases. Duke Law Journal, 43, 217–
266. 
Walster, E. (1966). Assignment of responsibility for an accident. Journal of Personali-
ty and Social Psychology, 3, 73–79. 
Weiner, B., & Graham, S. (1989). Understanding the motivational role of affect: Life-
span research from an attributional perspective. Cognition and Emotion, 3, 401–
419. 
Wexler, D. B., & Schopp, R. F. (1989). How and when to correct for juror hindsight 
bias in mental health malpractice litigation: Some preliminary observations. Be-
havioral Sciences & the Law, 7, 485–504. 
